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Comment and Casenotes
ANNULMENT JURISDICTION CLARIFIED
Certain doubts about, and short-comings of, the previ-
ous Maryland Law as to annulment jurisdiction were clari-
fied by a statute passed by the 1947 Legislature.' These
included various doubts as to jurisdiction, not only in the
sense of territorial jurisdiction, but also in the other sense
in which the word can be used.
The new statute accomplished this clarification princi-
pally by assimilating annulment jurisdiction to that for
divorce, as theretofore provided for. It did so by revising
Sections 382 and 391 of Article 16 so as to provide that
they should apply to annulment as well as divorce, in their
provisions for jurisdiction in courts of equity of certain
counties, for the use of orders of publication, and in juris-
diction over Federal reservations.
Furthermore, a new Section 16 of Article 624 was en-
acted which clarifies the previous practice whereby crimi-
nal conviction of one or both of the spouses may serve
also as an automatic annulment of the defective marriage,
concerning which the conviction was had.
Prior to the clarifying statute, there was considerable
doubt as to where was the appropriate court in which to
bring an annulment suit about a marriage not entirely
I Md. Laws 1947, Ch. 849, amending Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 16,
Sees. 38, 39; Art. 62, Sec. 16. For citations to the legal materials appli-
cable to the state of the law prior to the recent clarification, reference
will be made to specific pages of the following previous treatments in the
REVIEW: Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriages in Maryland and
Their Annulment (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211; and Comment, The Confusing
Maryland Domestic Relations Procedures (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 275. See
also, in the same issue with this, noting a case which arose under the
previous law: (Note) Marriage Performed by Telephone Invalid (1948)
9 Md. L. Rev. 79 noting Fleet v. Fleet, Ct. Ct. No. 2, Balto. City.
2 Which theretofore had provided for equity Jurisdiction over divorce.
In the court of the county either where the plaintiff or the defendant
resided, for the use of orders of publication, or other substituted service.
and for the taking of testimony in pro confesso cases.8 Which theretofore had provided that residence on Federal reserva-
tions within Maryland should be tantamount to Maryland residence for
divorce purposes.
"This Section had also been revised two years earlier, Md. Laws 1945.
Ch. 664. Both the 1945 revision and the 1947 one, now under discussion,
had been proposed by the Bar Association of Baltimore City, at the
motion of its Committee on Amendment of the Law. On the history of
this procedure for automatic annulment as a result of criminal conviction,
see (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 250, and (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 275, 278.
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localized in one county.5 There was doubt whether it
should be brought where the plaintiff lived, or the defen-
dant lived, or where the ceremony had been performed,
as could arise if those three phases involved as many
counties or states. In fact, there was one trial court ruling6
requiring the case to be brought in the county where the
defendant lived, if he lived anywhere in Maryland, al-
though, as a matter of practice, cases had been brought
previously on any one alone of the factors mentioned
above. The new statute makes it clear that annulment
cases may be brought in any county where any one of these
factors occurs.
Of course, if the annulment be granted as an incident
of a criminal conviction under the revised Article 62, Sec-
tion 16, the requisite jurisdictional basis for the proceed-
ing would have to be that necessary to confer criminal
jurisdiction, i. e., that the marriage in question had oc-
curred in the very county where the indictment was re-
turned. Similarly, because of the criminal nature of the
basic proceeding, it would be necessary actually to arrest
the defendant and bring him to trial-the order of publica-
tion basis would not be available for this method.
Furthermore, there was previous doubt whether orders
of publication or other forms of substituted service could
be used in civil annulment cases, although they were cus-
tomarily so used, and the implication of Rule 10A7 of the
Court of Appeals General Equity Rules was that they
could be used. There was, however, no other authority
in case or statute to sustain this practice, but the new
statute makes it clear that it is permissible.
Then there was considerable doubt whether residence
on Federal reservations would alone suffice to confer Mary-
On this, see (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 256-59, and (1940) 4 Md. L.
Rev. 275, 279-80.
No. 2494 Divorces, Ct. Co. A. A. Co., 1945. This ruling held that Md.
Code Supp. (1947) Art. 75, Sec. 157, which requires, with certain excep-
tions, suits to be brought where the defendant resides, applied to annul-
ment cases as the law then stood, by analogy to the similar rule for
alimony, as distinguished from divorce, on which see Woodcock v. Wood-
cock, 169 Md. 40, 179 A. 826 (1935) noted (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 81.
1I. e., the rule of court which requires the plaintiff, beyond use of order
of publication or other attempt at substituted service, to make a show-
ing of an actual attempt to give notice to an absent defendant of the
pendency of a divorce or annulment suit. On the history of the sporadic
legislation formerly requiring the use of registered mail, see Strahorn
and Reiblich, The Haddock Case Overruled-The Future of Interstate
Divorce (1942) 7 Md. L. Rev. 29, 44-48. See also, on the lack of explicit
authority for using orders of publication in annulment cases prior to
the clarifying statute, (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 257, and (1940) 4 Md. L.
Rev. 275, 280.
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land jurisdiction, even conceding that Maryland residence
would do so.' This, too, has been straightened out, so that
it now does.
There was a question as to whether any procedure was
available for annuling marriages for the grounds of mis-
cegenation, lack of sufficient ceremony, non-age or lack of
marital intentionY This was because the only stated
sources of annulment jurisdiction lay in the old statute ap-
plicable only to bigamy and incest on the one hand,1"
and in the case law rule of the inherent power of equity
over the contract impediments on the other." The new
statute broadly refers to annulment, and so covers all
grounds for attacking the validity of a marriage.
Furthermore, the new statute consolidates the various
annulment procedures under one heading and thus simpli-
fies matters, as well as clarifies doubts. It brings together
the older statutory procedure and the inherent equity pro-
cedure, and makes the consolidated procedure cover any
defect in marriage.
To be sure, there is still preserved the anomalous blur-
ring of annulment and divorce whereby divorces, so-called,
may be granted either for impotence, or for any ground
making the marriage void ab initio.12 If the reform had
been as extensive as it could have been, this jurisdiction
might also have been transferred to the consolidated an-
nulment jurisdiction.
There was still preserved, and sensibly so, the idea that
a criminal conviction for marrying criminally should also
serve as an annulment of such marriages as could other-
wise be annulled. This provision had been in force for
some time, had been particularly improved at the previous
session of the Legislature, 13 and was further refined in the
I This was because it bad taken explicit legislation to make this clear
for divorce purposes, and it was not until the clarifying statute under
discussion that such a step was taken for annulment purposes. The re-
vised Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 16, Sec. 39 so provides.
On this, see (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 252, and (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev.
275, 280.
20 Md. Code (1939) Art. 62, Sec. 16, prior to the current revision and
that of two years before. This, until the time of the current revision
had provided an alternative of a civil proceeding by petition (now
merged with the divorce and equity procedure) and the criminal pro-
ceeding, still in force.
11 See (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 251-2, and (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 275, 278.
1 t Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 16, Sec. 40. This procedure might, per-
haps, have been available for the grounds of miscegenation, lack of suf-
ficient ceremony, non-age, or lack of marital Intention, mentioned just
above. See (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 252.
"' Md. Laws 1945, Ch. 664, amending Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 62.
Sec. 16.
1948]
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recent statute. Whereas, formerly it had only applied to
bigamy and incest, the new statute now extends to pro-
hibited inter-racial marriages. These three grounds are
the only ones for which the marriage is both criminal and
capable of annulment. 4 So it is that the new statute com-
pleted the picture in that regard.
The new statute provides that a conviction of one or
both of the spouses shall serve as an annulment from and
after there being docketed on an equity docket a transcript
of the docket entries in the case leading to the criminal
conviction. 5
The new statute does not purport to solve a problem
which was implicit in the pre-statutory law, whether it
was permissible to entertain annulment suits in Maryland
lacking either domicile of either party or place of cere-
mony in Maryland, merely because personal jurisdiction
could be obtained over the defendant by service of pro-
cess in Maryland. 6 There have been suggestions, lacking
Court of Appeals authority, that personal jurisdiction
alone over the defendant would suffice to entitle an annul-
ment case to be tried in Maryland even though the other
factors were lacking.17
It could be argued, of course, that the new statute as-
serts exclusive jurisdiction on the basis only of the factors
mentioned therein, i. e., domicile of either party or place
of ceremony and, therefore, means to negate further juris-
diction based on mere personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant alone. This, of course, remains to be seen after
future interpretation of what the new statute means.
Furthermore, the new statute does not attempt to solve
the possible constitutional question as to whether per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant is necessary in order
for the case to be brought properly, even if some of the
"For all the other grounds, the situation is either that an annulment
may be obtained but there is no criminality involved, or there is a possi-
bility of criminal conviction but the criminality does not affect the
validity of the marriage. Thus it is that only in the three situations
now included in the statute can a criminal conviction also serve as an
annulment.
15 This particular detail was first put into the statute in the revision
of 1945, and prior thereto there was doubt as to just how the provision
for automatic annulment upon criminal conviction really worked. Since
the 1945 revision, there is a record of such annulments in the same
places as would be found docket entries of normal annulments in equity.
"Apparently answering this question in the negative was the trial
court case of Archer v. McManamon, Ct. Ct. Prince George's County,
Baltimore Daily Record, February 8, 1944, dismissing a bill to annul
a marriage performed in Cecil County, on the ground that neither party
was a resident of Prince George's County.
" See (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 258, and (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 275, 280.
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three alternative factors the statute asserts as a minimum
basis of jurisdiction be present. The statute assumes that
personal service is not a constitutional necessity (and
that annulment jurisdiction may be exercised on an in rem
basis) by providing for the use of orders of publication
where personal service of process is impossible, i. e.,
against non-residents and residents who are twice returned
non est. The RPvmw has elsewhere discussed the broader
phases of this problem. 8
The new statute does not touch on the question whether
a legal defect in marriage has the impact of making it
totally void on the one hand, or merely voidable on the
other.'" There was no need for this to be done, inasmuch
as an available annulment procedure for a given defect
equally may be used to annul, whether the marriage is
only voidable, and needs annulment, or is totally void and
could be attacked collaterally, even lacking any annulment.
Furthermore, the new statute makes no contribution
to the solution of the problem as to whether there are avail-
able any procedures in Maryland law for the purpose of
asserting the validity of a marriage, as contrasted with as-
serting its invalidity, which is the normal purpose of annul-
ment procedure.20 The question is thus still open as to
the availability of the former type of procedure, probably
now to be litigated by way of Declaratory Judgment pro-
cedure, enacted, and more recently clarified, by the Mary-
land Legislature.2'
To be sure, the clarification statute as to the Declaratory
Judgment law specifically provides2 that the declaratory
procedure shall not be used for obtaining a divorce or an
annulment of a marriage. Yet nevertheless there would
still be the possibility of using that procedure for the pur-
pose of asserting the validity of a marriage, which is the
opposite of annulment, inasmuch as there is no other direct
procedure for so doing.
The new statute is concerned with annulment "juris-
diction" in various senses of that latter word. First, it is
concerned with territorial jurisdiction of annulment pro-
cedure, as that phrase means variously (1) what are the
18 Note, Action to Impress Trust on Stock is In Peronam (1944) 8 Md. L.
Rev. 289, 292-93.
1 The distinction between voidness and voidability of defective mar-
riages was the basic theme of the article cited herein throughout, supra
n. 1. (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211.
20 See (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 252-56, and (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 275,
279-80.
:'Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 31A.
OIbid., Sec. 6.
1948]
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requisite contacts between the facts of the case and par-
ticular area, state or county in which it is brought, in order
to permit the case there to be brought; and (2) also as to
what is the requisite minimum contact between the pro-
ceeding and the defendant who is being sued, in order to
permit the case to be a valid one so far as the defendant's
interests are concerned. Furthermore, the statute is also
concerned with the idea of "jurisdiction" in the other
sense, of the proper court amongst various courts in which
the case may be brought in the appropriate area. Thus, it
clarifies the law to the effect that annulment cases of any
and all sorts may properly be brought in equity courts of
the appropriate counties in Maryland.
This carries forward the reform of an earlier Legis-
lature28 which had clarified the archaic reference to the
Superior Court of Baltimore City24 as the appropriate
court for certain types of annulment, and also makes it
clear that any type of annulment may be brought in equity,
beyond those formerly thought to belong there. It also
removes doubts as to there being any appropriate court
for certain marriage impediments, as to which uncertainty
had prevailed.
There was one further routine clarification, to an effect
that was probably accepted as the divorce rule prior there-
to. This has to do with orders of publication against both
non-residents and persons who may be proceeded against
as non-residents, i. e., residents who are not subject to
process after two attempts of service by the sheriff, and
two returns of non est, under the general statute in that
regard.25 It is now specifically provided26 that orders of
publication may as well be used against resident persons
who may be proceeded against as non-residents, as against
actual non-residents, and the law is thus clarified in that
connection.
Whereas the divorce law still requires a period of one
year's residence in order for a divorce suit to be filed, if the
grounds occurred outside of the state,27 the newly clarified
annulment procedure does not so require, even where the
marriage was performed outside Maryland, and local juris-
diction is based only on residence of one or the other of
the parties in Maryland. As the clarifying law was pro-
28 See 8upra, n. 4.
2 The Superior Court at one time had equity jurisdiction. See (1938)
2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 250, and (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 275, 278.
15 Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 141.
85 Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 16, See. 38.
27 Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 16, See. 43.
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posed to the legislature the one year requirement would
have been imposed for marriages performed outside of
Maryland, but the legislature saw fit to delete that require-
ment so that as the law actually reads, a person who is a
resident of Maryland may sue or be sued for annulment
whether the marriage was performed here or elsewhere,
and regardless of the duration of Maryland residence, so
long as it is a bona fide residence. If the marriage was
performed in Maryland then, under the new statute, the
parties may litigate without residence of either and with-
out waiting any particular period.
As pointed out above,28 the requirements of the Court
of Appeals Rule 10A, as to giving of actual notice, if possi-
ble, whenever a divorce or annulment suit is prosecuted
by order of publication or the equivalent, still apply. Rule
10A was promulgated prior to the enactment of the clari-
fying statute and it assumed the propriety of using orders
of publication in annulment cases as well as in divorce
cases, although, as pointed out above, there was no other
statutory or case law authority for so using orders of publi-
cation in annulment cases.
The new statute thus serves to ratify the assumption
of the Court of Appeals rule that orders of publication are
proper or were proper to be used in annulment cases as
well as in divorce cases.
Thus, it is that the new statute has suitably clarified
the pre-existing and confusing law as to annulment juris-
diction in Maryland. It has done this by assimilating an-
nulment jurisdiction to that for divorce wherever that
was feasible. While the law is now considerably clearer
than it was before, yet one thing could still be done for
accomplishing complete clarification of annulment juris-
diction in Maryland.
That would be to repeal the present law29 whereby
divorces a vinculo matrimonii may be granted for either
impotence or "for any ground making the marriage void
ab initio" and to transfer jurisdiction thereof to the annul-
ment jurisdiction, so that all annulments, so called or sub-
stantially so, would be granted under the same procedure.
It still remains an historical anomaly to grant divorces,
so called, for those two nominal reasons, when annulment
of marriage is what is being really accomplished, although
under the name of divorce.
91 Supra, n. 7.
29 Supra, n. 12.
19481
